The past which the present acknowledges tends to be deceptively simple. Attention is most frequently paid to those of its aspects which appear to have anticipated the present, or to those which contrast with what the present takes to be most uniquely its own. Consequently, the past in which the present takes an interest tends to change, and it is unlikely that successive generations will assign equal significance to precisely the same aspects of what occurred in the past. This (...) need not lead to distorted views of those particular features on which attention is focused, but it can lead to a neglect of whatever aspects of the past are not of pressing present concern. Consequently, the context in which any generation views the past may easily become too narrow, and a sense of the past’s complexity will be lost. For reasons that I have elsewhere suggested, this situation is more likely to obtain in the field of cultural history than in studies of political and institutional change. When previous views as to what is most important in literature, or in philosophy, or in the arts undergo change, the whole history of these forms of endeavor will reflect that change. In what follows, I wish to call attention to some of the ways in which our own philosophic preconceptions have led to a neglect of important facets of nineteenth-century thought. (shrink)

If there is an age in which philosophy seemed to experience a demise it is the nineteenth century, and yet this was not due to a lack of philosophy nor to the fact that there prevailed an attitude of estrangement from philosophy. Rather, what appeared to be a de-emphasis was merely a replacement of writings by "philosophers" with those by the natural scientist and the humanist. Tatarkiewicz divides his period into three phases distinguishing the (...) era with their peculiar disciplines: 1830-60 marked by positivism, empiricism, naturalism, and dialectical materialism; 1860-80 in which the minimalistic philosophy of positivism reached full bloom; 1880-1900 dominated by minimalism, positivism, scientism and in addition the appearance of opposing doctrines. Although such familiar names as Comte, Mill, Marx, Engels, Spencer, Brentano and Nietzsche find their way into Tatarkiewicz’ book, of greater significance is the manifold of less familiar figures who play a determining role in this period of philosophy. Yet it is not the author’s intent to expound individual doctrines in reference to anything but philosophical currents of the day. Tatarkiewicz focuses on times not men. A very good summary is presented at the end of the book mapping out the social, economic, political, geographic, and religious climate prevalent in the nineteenth century, thus concluding a helpful survey of a period that has been somewhat neglected in the history of philosophy.—K.R.M. (shrink)

Investigate the challenging and nuanced philosophy of the long nineteenth century from Kant to Bergson Philosophy in the nineteenth century was characterized by new ways of thinking, a desperate searching for new truths. As science, art, and religion were transformed by social pressures and changing worldviews, old certainties fell away, leaving many with a terrifying sense of loss and a realization that our view of things needed to be profoundly rethought. The Blackwell Companion to (...) Nineteenth-Century Philosophy covers the developments, setbacks, upsets, and evolutions in the varied philosophy of the nineteenth century, beginning with an examination of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, instrumental in the fundamental philosophical shifts that marked the beginning of this new and radical age in the history of philosophy. Guiding readers chronologically and thematically through the progression of nineteenth-century thinking, this guide emphasizes clear explanation and analysis of the core ideas of nineteenth-century philosophy in an historically transitional period. It covers the most important philosophers of the era, including Hegel, Fichte, Schopenhauer, Mill, Kierkegaard, Marx, Nietzsche, Bradley, and philosophers whose work manifests the transition from the nineteenth century into the modern era, such as Sidgwick, Peirce, Husserl, Frege and Bergson. The study of nineteenth-century philosophy offers us insight into the origin and creation of the modern era. In this volume, readers will have access to a thorough and clear understanding of philosophy that shaped our world. (shrink)

Hegel and the myth of reason -- Hegel's phenomenology as a systematic fragment -- The architectonic of Hegel's Phenomenology of spirit -- Points of contact in the philosophy of religion of Hegel and Schopenhauer -- Kierkegaard's criticism of the absence of ethics in Hegel's system -- Kierkegaard's criticism of abstraction and his proposed solution : appropriation -- Kierkegaard's recurring criticism of Hegel's The good and conscience-- Hegel and Nietzsche on the death of (...) tragedy and Greek ethical life -- Existentialist ethics -- Merleau-Ponty's criticisms of Sartre's theory of freedom -- Sartre and Merleau-Ponty on consciousness and bad faith. (shrink)

In this paper, I outline valuable insights that current theorists working in urban environmental ethics can gain from the analysis of nineteenth century urban contexts. Specifically, I argue that an analysis of urban areas during this time reveals two sets of competing metaphysical commitments that, when accepted, shift both the design of urban environments and our relationship with the natural world in these contexts. While one set of metaphysical commitments could help inform current projects in urban environmental ethics, (...) the second “de-animalized” or “cleansed” commitments that influenced the structure of post-nineteenth century urban areas could potentially harm projects in urban environmental ethics. Thus we need to be particularly careful when choosing a metaphysical base for our current urban environmental ethics, as, depending on your specific project, implicitly accepting certain commitments could inadvertently work against the overall goals of the project. (shrink)

In 1828, G. W. F. Hegel published a critical review of Johann Georg Hamann, a retrospective of the life and works of one of Germany’s most enigmatic and challenging thinkers and writers. While Hegel’s review had enjoyed a central place in Hamann studies since its appearance, Hegel on Hamann is the first English translation of the important work. Philosophers, theologians, and literary critics welcome Anderson’s stunning translation since Hamann is gaining renewed attention, not only as a key (...) figure of German intellectual history, but also as an early forerunner of postmodern thought. Relationships between Enlightenment, Counter Enlightenment, and Idealism come to the fore as Hegel reflects on Hamann’s critiques of his contemporaries Immanuel Kant, Moses Mendelssohn, J. G. Herder, and F. H. Jacobi. Hegel on Hamann also includes an introduction to Hegel’s review by Anderson, as well as an essay on the role of friendship in Hamann’s life, in Hegel’s thought, and in German intellectual culture more broadly. Rounding out the volume are its extensive annotations and bibliography, which facilitate further study of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophy in English and German. This book is essential both for readers of Hegel or Hamann and for those interested in the history of German thought, the philosophy of religion, language and hermeneutics, or friendship as a philosophical category. (shrink)

In her insightful and stimulating article, The Mind of a Moral Agent, Professor Susanna Blumenthal traces the influence of Scottish Common Sense philosophy on early American law. Among other things, Blumenthal argues that the basic model of moral agency upon which early American jurists relied, which drew heavily from Common Sense philosophers like Thomas Reid, generated certain paradoxical conclusions about legal responsibility that later generations were forced to confront. "Having cast their lot with the Common Sense philosophers in the (...) "formative era" of American law," she explains, "early republican jurists thus bequeathed to future generations of lawyers a problem of responsibility of no small proportions." In this invited comment for Law and History Review, I first argue that the problems of responsibility on which Blumenthal focuses our attention are not specific to Scottish Common Sense, but rather descend straight from the core of the Western legal and moral tradition. The same problems would arise if Common Sense philosophy had never existed. Second, even if it is true that Common Sense exerted a powerful influence on American academic life in the antebellum period, it still must be shown that this influence extended to specific features of American law, which remained at the time almost entirely the product of English common law. Blumenthal has not met this burden, however, because she does not identify any specific doctrines or judicial opinions that might support the conclusion that early American jurists "were steeped in Common Sense philosophy" or sought to construct "an indigenous legal tradition, built on the universalistic premises of Common Sense." Rather, her defense of this interesting claim is highly selective, resting mainly on the writings of Wilson and Hoffman. Third, although Blumenthal claims that there is something puzzling or paradoxical from a Common Sense perspective about the diversity of moral opinion, the existence of irrational or evil actors, or the fact that individuals often disregard the dictates of their moral sense, she does not adequately explain what exactly that paradox is, nor why Common Sense adherents should be troubled by it. Locke had made objections like these familiar as a result of his attack on innate practical principles in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Yet already by the eighteenth century, critics like Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Reid, and their followers had rejected Locke's arguments as based on mere confusion and fallacy. Finally, a key point that Blumenthal neglects, as does John Witt in his elegant chapter on Wilson, is that Common Sense philosophers also supplied positive scientific arguments for innate moral knowledge, based on observation and induction rather than introspection, whose intellectual worth has proved remarkably durable. We risk misunderstanding Scottish Common Sense and its place in the history of ideas if we overlook contributions like these, or remain content to think of it merely as an unduly optimistic philosophy, which relied mainly on introspection to affirm the innate goodness of humankind, but which gave way to a more accurate theory of human nature as the nineteenth century unfolded. Certainly there is some truth to this description, but it is only part of the story, and a potentially misleading one. (shrink)

Hypotheticals, conditionals, and their connecting relation, implication, dramatically changed their meanings during the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century. Modern logicians ordinarily do not distinguish between the terms hypothetical and conditional. Yet in the late nineteenth century their meanings were quite different, their ties to the implication relation either were unclear, or the implication relation was used exclusively as a logical operator. I will trace the development of implication as an inference operator from these (...) earlier notions into the first third of the twentieth century using as the starting point the ideas primarily of R. Whately and W. Hamilton before discussing the work of the transitional logicians, A. De Morgan and G. Boole on these topics. Then we discuss the relevant views of four prominent but relatively unknown nineteenth century British logicians, W.E. Johnson, J.N. Keynes, E.E.C. Jones, and H. MacColl, as well as those of the more influential logicians, W.S. Jevons and J. Venn, closing with a section on ‘implication as inference’ where we explore some key ideas of B. Russell and sketch the work of D. Hilbert, P. Hertz, and G. Gentzen who together are responsible for the development of the modern ideas related to the subjects of this paper. (shrink)

Nanda writes disparagingly of "Hindu" intellectuals--including those in the West - who try to produce alternative sciences often inspired by post-modernism. She is unaware that many - including Einstein and Schrödinger - fit her descriptions of such "Hindu" Western prophets "facing backward" who revolutionized science by "alternative sciences". She misreads those positions she criticizes into one anti-science conspiracy of post-modernism and Vedic science adherents. Her misconstructions are easy to spot Examples: Key citations on India are Western; her statements often ex-cathedra (...) statements. Her history is patchy, sometimes wrong. She derides social-constructionism but turns to it when she wants it. A presumed Western leftist she quotes Daniel Bell ("End of Ideology") approvingly. "Third Ways" and "Alternatives" between alleged Western liberalism and Marxism which she denounces are in the Western left agenda for nearly thirty years. She ignores key factors in India's predicament like low literacy. Nanda derides contemporary Hindu nationalism as a scavenger picking up from different sources. This "scavenging" however, is a sign of confidence, paralleling the attitude of Europeans during hte Renaissance and the Enlightenment. Although she claims that there are a few elements from the Indic tradition which are useful, she does not explore this except for Ambedkar Buddhism. Here she puts more emphasis on its alleged western roots than on Ambedkar's declared Buddhism. For her, Western modernity is one universal ignoring the many different trajectories different western societies have taken in their science development. She regrets the breaking down in comtemporary India of conventional boundaries between presumed right, left, progress and development. Instead of rewriting received Western wisdom to fit this real historical experience of India, she resorts to only Western conceptual categories. She damns both Indian social reality as well as attempts at fresh Indian conceptualization. For her, secularization means brainwashing the local populaton into an unashamed McCauleyite template illustrating deep feelings of insecurity about her own culture. (shrink)

Paul Gorner must be commended for a masterful exposition of some of the major trends and thinkers of the German tradition of the twentieth century. He seeks out what would comprise a unique mode of philosophizing of the German tradition. He finds this mode to consist of a specific influence and reading of Kant at the level of transcendental philosophy and its attendant debates. Indeed, the author constantly refers various trends and thinkers to Kantian problematic of the constitution (...) of transcendental conditions of experience, ethics, and the thing in itself. This includes the issues of egological solipsism, the problems of communal participation in various epistemic ventures, and the question of presuppositions. While the text is written to emphasize the transcendental trend, it also shows the intrinsic issues and challenges to this trend in German tradition, specifically with respect to the questions of transcendental consciousness, Being, history, interpretation, and language. (shrink)

Although feminist philosophers have been critical of the gendered norms contained within the history of philosophy, they have not extended this critical analysis to norms concerning disability. In the history of Western philosophy, disability has often functioned as a metaphor for something that has gone awry. This trope, according to which disability is something that has gone wrong, is amply criticized within Disability Studies, though not within the tradition of philosophy itself or even (...) within feminist philosophy. In this paper, I use one instance of this disability metaphor, contained within a passage from Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, in order to show that paying attention to disability and disability theory can enable identification of ableist assumptions within the tradition of philosophy and can also open up new interpretations of canonical texts. On my reading, whereas Hegel’s expressed views of disability are dismissive, his logic and its treatment of contingency offer up useful ways to situate and re-evaluate disability as part of the concept of humanity. Disability can in fact be useful to Hegel, especially in the context of his valorization of experiences of disruption and disorientation. Broadening our understanding of the possible ways that the philosophical tradition has conceived human beings allows us to better draw on its theoretical resources. (shrink)

Hegel’s political philosophy regards the “corporation” as both a civil society association and an institution guaranteed under the constitution. The present article focuses on the concept of corporation as an institution of the ‘internal constitution’ by analysing some of the writings which go back to Hegel’s Heidelberg and Berlin phases, namely the Heidelberg review of the Proceedings of the Estates Assembly of the Kingdom of Württemberg, 1815–1816, his first lectures on the Philosophy of Rights, and the (...) Elements of the Philosophy of Rights. Notwithstanding the analysis shows that Hegel’s sophisticated constitutional culture is informed directly by, and developed along with, his involvement in the Württemberg’s political debates, yet his idea of State administration is far more elaborate than the constitutions of nineteenth-century German States which it does not, in fact, intend to merely reproduce. I shall argue that Hegel’s account of corporation is based on his specific understanding of European history and the related conceptualization of institution as a guarantee of freedom. Both history and theory are necessary tools to frame and comprehend the philosopher’s discussion of corporation, whose civil and institutional nature is essential to conceive the connection established between the government of civil society and legislative power. I contend that the role that Hegel attributes to corporations cannot be interpreted as an idea reflecting or inherited from the history of the German states, and that rather it represents the key to understanding his concept of patriotism and model of political representation via the assemblies of estates. From this perspective, it appears clear that the Hegelian theory of corporation is at the center of the philosopher’s diagnosis on the crisis and evolution of the modern State. (shrink)

There are a bewildering variety of claims connecting Darwin to nineteenth-century philosophy of science—including to Herschel, Whewell, Lyell, German Romanticism, Comte, and others. I argue here that Herschel’s influence on Darwin is undeniable. The form of this influence, however, is often misunderstood. Darwin was not merely taking the concept of “analogy” from Herschel, nor was he combining such an analogy with a consilience as argued for by Whewell. On the contrary, Darwin’s Origin is written in precisely the (...) manner that one would expect were Darwin attempting to model his work on the precepts found in Herschel’s Preliminary Discourse on Natural Science. While Hodge has worked out a careful interpretation of both Darwin and Herschel, drawing similar conclusions, his interpretation misreads Herschel’s use of the vera causa principle and the verification of hypotheses. The new reading that I present here resolves this trouble, combining Hodge’s careful treatment of the structure of the Origin with a more cautious understanding of Herschel’s philosophy of science. This interpretation lets us understand why Darwin laid out the Origin in the way that he did and also why Herschel so strongly disagreed, including in Herschel’s heretofore unanalyzed marginalia in his copy of Darwin’s book. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.1 (2001) 161-163 [Access article in PDF] Avrum Stroll. Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. Pp. ii + 302. Cloth, $32.50. Analytic philosophy has entered the history of philosophy since the greatest twentieth-century philosophers of that tradition are dead or retired. It is appropriate then to have a book (...) that clearly and accurately explains the main theories and identifies its character. Avrum Stroll has written such a book, and more. He explains and evaluates where analytic philosophy is today and speculates about where it might go from here.Reserving the first and last chapters for discussion later, I will begin with the seven intervening ones: 2. "Philosophical Logic," 3. "Logical Positivism and the Tractatus," 4. "G. E. Moore: A Ton of Bricks," 5. "Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy: 'The Stream of Life,'" 6. "Ryle and Austin: the Golden Age of Oxford Philosophy," 7. "W. V. O. Quine," and 8."Direct Reference Theories." Chapter 2 deals mostly with Frege and Russell, and Chapter 8 deals mostly with Kripke and Putnam. As the titles and contents indicate, Stroll inclines to a great man understanding of philosophical history, a sensible [End Page 161] approach given the consensus that four or five philosophers have dominated analytic philosophy in the last century, with another four or five being especially talented.Among his expositions of the various philosophical "isms," such as logical atomism and positivism, Stroll intersperses biographical matters that give the book rhythm—he demolishes the widespread idea popularized by Ray Monk that Wittgenstein was anti-Semitic—and charm—he quotes a letter that Wittgenstein wrote to Moore shortly after learning that a certain piece of work could not count as his bachelor's thesis at Cambridge: Dear Moore: Your letter annoyed me. When I wrote Logik I didn't consult the Regulations, and therefore I think it would only be fair if you gave me my degree without consulting them so much either!... If I am not worth you making an exception for me even in some STUPID details then I may as well go to HELL directly... (pp. 91-2). In Chapter One, "The Solera System," Stroll lays out the controlling analogy of his book. The system refers to a way of making sherry. A quantity of wine, drawn from the oldest and best barrel, is replaced by the same quantity drawn from the next oldest, and so one for each successive barrel. The old wine improves the new, and the new refreshes the old. Likewise, "old philosophy has the power to educate and improve new philosophy," according to Stroll. He then continues: "And new philosophy not only preserves the quality and character of old philosophy but has the capacity to refresh it" (246).Also in Chapter One, Stroll observes that "philosophy is essentially a humanistic activity" (3). As such philosophy is tied to its history in a way that science is not. I would put his underlying point differently. Philosophy is humanistic because its problems are timeless and universal; these include what it is to exist, what it is to be conscious, what causation is, and what is the good life. Further, its solutions rarely hang on technical devices.But something has been amiss. Most of the theories distinctive of analytic philosophy, from the theory of descriptions, to modal logic, the causal theory of names, and functionalism, seem to approach these problems obliquely. Also, some of the most respected analytic theories are 'evasion' theories. Eschewing the need to give a substantive account of relations, analytic philosophers hold that relations are n-tuples of objects, which themselves are reducible to unordered sets of objects. Notwithstanding its formal adequacy, the substantive issue seems to be left begging. Loving, causing, being taller than, and being the square of are all relations, but is it illuminating to treat all of them in the same way? Moderating his normal optimism, Stroll says, "I wonder whether the very conception of the role of philosophy has not changed recently. It strikes me that the classical problems that the solera model presupposes are... (shrink)

Anton Dohrn rejected the popular Amphioxus-ascidian theory of vertebrate origin, which saw Amphioxus as the most primitive vertebrate and ascidians as vertebrate ancestors. Instead he argued for the segmented annelids as the more likely candidate. Attacked for being 'unscientific' by such popular morphologists as Carl Gegenbaur and Ernst Haeckel, Dohrn countered with similar accusations. Since the debate peaked as Dohrn was establishing his Stazione Zoologica in Naples at the end of the nineteenth century, it gained him valuable attention (...) and may have encouraged him to retain his view even in the face of new and problematic evidence. This paper explores Dohrn's contributions and the underlying commitments revealing what he regarded as important in science. (shrink)

There are nine chapters: Chapter 1 introduces an analogy between philosophy and sherry-making to show that the historical tradition flavors the new analytic one. It then takes note of the difficulty of any general definition of analytic philosophy, and thus introduces the book’s methodology: examining the positions of some notable analytic philosophers so that the reader can grasp the family resemblance concept of analytic philosophy. Chapter 2 deals primarily with the role of Russell’s logic, touching on ideal (...) languages, definite descriptions, Frege and the problem of identity, and logical atomism. Chapter 3, “Logical Positivism and the Tractatus,” curiously devotes fifteen pages to Russell before turning to its eponymous topic, the Tractatus, and to Carnap. Chapter 4 is devoted to Moore, chapter 5 to the later Wittgenstein, chapter 6 to Ryle and Austin, chapter 7 to Quine, chapter 8 to direct reference theories. The concluding ninth chapter evaluates the contribution of analytic philosophy; argues that Wittgenstein alone will be history’s great philosopher of the century; considers briefly some current trends, identity theory and functionalism; and finally predicts that philosophy will continue to play an important role in the humanities in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

In 1857, a Statistical Society was founded in the Netherlands. Within this society, statistics was considered a systematic, quantitative, and qualitative description of society. In the course of time, the society attracted a wide and diverse membership, although the number of physicians on its rolls was low. The society itself was dynamic, discussing statistical and economic topics at its annual meetings, working to compile a ‘General Statistics of the Netherlands’, and publishing a yearbook. Although the lack of well-organised, official, state-generated (...) statistics played a role in the foundation and continued existence of the Statistical Society, this does not seem reason enough to explain why the society changed its name and stopped being engaged in statistical matters when a central official statistics organisation was finally created in the Netherlands in 1892. Explaining this transformation is important, as the abolition of that aspect of the society was crucial to the development of statistics in the Netherlands. In this paper, I sketch the foundation, history, and the demise of the Dutch Statistical Society and compare some of its characteristics with the English Royal Statistical Society. Through this examination, I try to answer the question why this 19th-century statistical society abandoned statistics. (shrink)

The late Professor Basil Willey's important and influential inquiry into the history of religious and moral ideas in the nineteenth century has become (since ...

Nietzsche is generally regarded as a severe critic of historical method and scholarship; this view has influenced much of contemporary discussions about the role and nature of historical scholarship. In this article I argue that this view is seriously mistaken . I do so by examining what he actually says about understanding history and historical method, as well as his relation to the founders of modern German historiography . I show, contrary to most expectations, that Nietzsche knew these historians (...) well and that he fundamentally affirmed their view of historical method. What he primarily objected to among his contemporaries was that historical scholarship was often regarded as a goal in itself, rather than as a means, and consequently that history was placed above philosophy. In fact, a historical approach was essential for Nietzsche’s whole understanding of philosophy, and his own philosophical project. (shrink)

Although, as many scholars have noted, Hegel appears to dismiss common sense, I argue that his claim that speculative philosophy can provide the rational ground for what is implicit in ordinary consciousness amounts to a critical vindication of common sense. Hegel’s attitude to common sense/ordinary consciousness is thus more complex and intriguing than either the longstanding consensus on his dismissal of and disdain for common sense, or the McDowellian attempt to ally Hegel’s position with later-Wittgensteinian (...) philosophical therapy. Hegel’s critique of ordinary consciousness, I conclude, should be read as a nuanced philosophical vindication of common sense. (shrink)

Tra le figure più importanti del dibattito filosofico italiano del Novecento, Antonio Banfi ha svolto nell'Italia del secondo dopoguerra anche un ruolo politico di rilievo come senatore del PCI. La sua interpretazione del marxismo ha presentato una forte accentuazione umanistica. Tra i suoi scolari filosofi e storici della filosofia come Giulio Preti, Enzo Paci, Remo Cantoni, Paolo Rossi. Il saggio prende in esame la prima fase della riflessione filosofica di Banfi, nella quale ha una importanza decisiva la conoscenza diretta del (...) dibattito tedesco tra le due guerre mondiali, in primo luogo della fenomenologia di Husserl e della ontologia di N. Hartmann. I Principi di una teoria della ragione - libro apparso alla fine degli anni '20 - e poi una serie di incisivi saggi degli anni '30 documentano una conoscenza approfondita e critica di un dibattito di cui mostrerà di nutrirsi in misura decisiva l'interpretazione di Banfi non solo di Hegel, ma anche di Marx. Among the leading philosophers in Italy during the 20th century, Antonio Banfi played an important role not only in the cultural debate during the 1930s and the 1940s, but also in the political scene of post-war Italy, advocating - as a representative of the Italian Communist Party in Italian Senate - a liberal, humanist view of Marxism. Among his students were influential philosophers and historians of philosophy such as Giulio Preti, Enzo Paci, Remo Cantoni and Paolo Rossi. This paper investigates the first phase of Banfi's philosophical development, an analysis of which must include a scrutiny of Banfi's deep indebtedness to German debate between the two World Wars, primarily Husserl's phenomenology and Hartmann's critical ontology. Banfi's phenomenological apprenticeship at the school of Husserl, and the sensitive and critical attitude of his presentation of the German debate in his Principi di una teoria della ragione, are of substantial importance in nourishing his later interpretation of Hegel and Marx. (shrink)

This article examines three moments of the post-Kantian philosophical tradition in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: Kantianism, Post-Kantian Idealism, and Neo-Kantianism. It elucidates the distinctive methods of a tradition that has never entirely disappeared and is now acknowledged once again as the source of contemporary insights. It outlines two problematics—naturalist scepticism and historicist nihilism—threatening the possibility of metaphysics. The first concerns sceptical worries about reason, emerging from attempts to extend the methods of natural science to the study of (...) human beings. Kant’s project of a critical and transcendental analysis of reason, with its distinctive methods, should be considered a response. The second arises from the development of new methods of historical inquiry, seeming to undermine the very possibility of individual agency. Also considered are Kant’s successors’ revisions of the critical and transcendental analysis of reason, undertaken to overcome challenges confronting the original versions of Kant’s methods. (shrink)

In the last century there were philosophers who argued that nothing exists but ideas. In our century there are people who write as if there were nothing but texts. These people, whom I shall call “textualists,” include for example, the so-called Yale school of literary criticism centering around Harold Bloom, Geoffrey Hartmann, and Paul De Man, “post-structuralist” French thinkers like Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, historians like Hayden White, and social scientists like Paul Rabinow. Some of these people (...) take their point of departure from Heidegger, but usually the influence of philosophers is relatively remote. The center of gravity of the intellectual movement in which these people figure is not philosophy, but literary criticism. In this paper I want to discuss some similarities and differences between this movement and nineteenth-century idealism. (shrink)

Since the 1980s, an immense wave of scholarship has recovered the voices of the many women who contributed to early modern philosophy, transforming our picture of the period. It is now typical for...

The third section considers the relevance of Levinas's work for reassessments of the realist novel through essays on Austen, Dickens, and George Eliot.